The agreement with Mercosur, a mirror of a double loss of influence

A quarter of a century. That's how long it took Mercosur, the South American common market, and the European Union (EU) to reach a trade agreement. The final text, presented on Wednesday, September 3, by the European Commission, must now be approved by the European Parliament and a qualified majority of member states. But in twenty-five years, the context has changed radically, forcing a compromise between initial hopes and the constraints that have accumulated.

The balance of power between blocs, the evolution of geopolitical alliances, the decline of free trade, the decline of the World Trade Organization, the acceleration of climate change, tensions within the agricultural world: these upheavals have inevitably led to the reformatting of what is presented as the largest trade agreement ever negotiated by the EU.

Mercosur countries, like the 27, are now vulnerable to the whims of a US president capable of imposing tariffs on those who refuse to pledge allegiance. Faced with this new situation, the two blocs are being pushed to cooperate. It is no longer simply a matter of expanding trade to stimulate growth, but of continuing to exist in an increasingly hostile environment.

The challenge for Europe is to obtain tariff exemptions on more than 90% of its exports to Mercosur, open public procurement markets to its companies, and improve its access to South American raw materials. In return, the EU commits to importing more agricultural products (beef, poultry, rice, sugar, soybeans, ethanol) under controlled conditions.

European supporters of the project present the treaty as a means of diversifying markets to offset the trade losses caused by the customs duties imposed by Donald Trump. It is also a matter of not giving China free rein in an area where it has great ambitions, and of helping to reduce our dependence on Beijing, particularly in the minerals needed for the ecological transition.

While these arguments are generally acceptable from an economic perspective, they also come at a price that European farmers are reluctant to pay. They fear being exposed to unfair competition that does not comply with EU standards, as Brussels is unable to implement adequate controls to ensure this. To address concerns raised by France in particular, the Commission has agreed to strengthen safeguard measures for "sensitive European products" and has committed to intervening in the event of a negative impact of imports on certain sectors.

These concessions, even if belated, are welcome. However, there is no indication that they will be enough to defuse agricultural anger and overcome dissatisfaction with a treaty that is merely a reflection of a double loss of influence. The EU is no longer able to unconditionally impose its standards on its trading partners and dictate how they should produce. The disintegration of the transatlantic relationship is permanently weakening Europe, which must find alternatives at the cost of compromise. As for France, it is beginning to realize that, between its budgetary incompetence and its political instability, it will find it increasingly difficult to influence European choices.